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Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point

TitleCan the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2020
AuthorsJules, S, Sylvain, B, Patrice, G, Thomas, V
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume76
Issue1
Pagination153 - 176
Date PublishedJan-05-2020
ISSN0924-6460
URLhttp://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y
DOI10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y
Short TitleEnviron Resource Econ
Catégorie HCERES
ACL - Peer-reviewed articles
Publication coopération et recherche SUD
Non